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A Basis for Civility
PHILIP D. SMITH

G

ive attention, if you will, to the virtue of civility. In this essay I
want to define civility, then give a bit of its history, continue by
predicting something of its future, and conclude by explaining

civility's true ground, at least as I understand it.
We are not here interested in politeness or courtesy, though those
meanings of "civility" may be ancillary to our topic. We are thinking instead
about the political realm, and we are aware that many voices have been
raised to decry the mean-spirited and vicious nature of politics, both in
attaining and using public office. \Vise people warn us that democratic gov
ernance depends on a kind of self-control, by which the participants in the
process guard it against internal meltdown. We ought to give careful atten
tion to civility, for democracy may depend on it.
Readers may find much to which they object in this essay, but they will
agree that it marks off an interesting topic for discussion. Suggested correc
tions, at any point, are welcome. The most important thing comes last, for I
hope readers will approve of what I say about the ground of civility even if
they disagree with my account of what it is, what its history has been, or
what its future may be.

A Definition of Civility
Civility has to do with treating political opponents well.
We set the stage by first defining "politics." Politics is the art or science
of making decisions for groups of people. Note that by this definition, many
activities count as political. Besides the politics of various kinds of govern
ments, this definition includes office politics, church politics, family politics,
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and university politics. "Politics" has a negative connotation in many minds,
but this need not be. Whenever groups of people need to make decisions,
there will be political decision-making. Sometimes political decisions are
made badly (unjustly, stupidly, or whatever), but sometimes they are made
well. Some political systems tend to produce more bad decisions than oth
ers-but that is the stuff of political theory, not the topic of this essay.
With this broad definition of politics in mind, we can ask interesting
questions about morality and politics. For instance, people often distinguish
political allies from political enemies, and we treat them very differently. I
am particularly interested in how we treat-more precisely, how we should
treat-our political enemies.1 The answer, I think, is that we should treat
our political opponents well.
W hat does it mean to treat one's political opponents well? For starters,
here are some prohibitions. We should not lie about our political oppo
nents; we should not attack their positions with "straw man" arguments, ad
hominem arguments, or other fallacious arguments; we should not break our
agreements with them; and we should not unnecessarily impute evil motives
to them. Positively, we should negotiate in good faith with our political ene
mies; we should debate issues honestly with them; and we should respect
them.
More could be added, but this gives some idea of what I mean by treat
ing political opponents well. Provisionally, I define "civility" to be a virtue,
that is, it is

a properly grounded character trait (or combination of traits) which
moves individuals or groups to treat political opponents well. Later, I will suggest
some modification of this definition, but it gives us enough to go on for

now.
Notice the qualification "properly grounded" in the definition. It is
possible for someone to be motivated to treat his political opponents well
for wrong reasons. Perhaps, like Aristotle's ignorant soldier, he does not
understand the cost of virtue; he blithely assumes that every thing will turn
out fine. Just as we would not say that a soldier who fails to comprehend
danger is truly brave, we would not say that a politician who had no idea
that treating his political opponents well Inight bring political defeat is truly
civil. Or, like Aristotle's professional soldier, someone Inight exhibit a
merely instrumental pseudo-virtue. If we treat political opponents well
because we calculate that such behavior is the best way to win, we are not
truly civil, just calculating.
True civility is the trait or traits of character that move one to treat
one's political opponents well for the right reasons. Further on, I will sug
gest what I think those reasons should be. But first we should look at the
reasons that have been traditionally given as grounds for civility.
1. I think there are also interesting issues surrounding the way we treat political allies,
but those matters are not the topic of this paper.
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A Modernist Virtue
In October,

1555,

Hugh Latimer was executed during the reign of

England's "Bloody" Mary. He was burned at the stake with a fellow protes
tant, Nicholas Ridley. As recorded in the martyrology, Acts

and Monuments,

by John Foxe, Latimer cried out when the fire was laid to the fuel: "Be of
good comfort, Mr. Ridley, and play the man! We shall this day light such a
candle, by God's grace, in England, as I trust never shall be put out."2
Latimer's courage when faced with death, and his good fortune to have
his death recorded in a popular marty rology, made him into a hero/saint of
the English reformation. What generations of readers of protestant history
didn't read, however, was that some y ears before his own execution, Latimer
presided over a "'jolly muster,' as a traditional-minded friar, John Forest,
was roasted alive over a fire made of a wooden statue of a saint hauled out of
a pilgrimmage church."3
Latimer's life and death is only one, though fairly gruesome, reminder
that Christians have not always treated their political enemies well. Medi
eval and Reformation histories are replete with imprisonments, tortures,
executions, and treacheries. Undoubtedly, many motivations and circum
stances lie behind such behaviors.

People acted out of greed, fear,

superstition, hatred-the whole catalogue of human sinfulness. But part of
the reason for some of this incivility, particularly in a case like Latimer's, was
philosophical.
All sides in reformation disputes assumed that there was such a thing as
true doctrine. If someone rejected true doctrine, he earned God's judgment
of eternal death, so if torture could bring about repentance, it was actually
good for the offender. Further, the heretic was a public blasphemer who
deserved death. Finally, innocent people might be corrupted if they listened
to the heretic's ideas. Matters of truth, especially of religious truth, were
regarded as having highest importance-literally infinite importance. These
factors produced a logic of intolerance. Those with positions of influence or
power, such as Queen Mary, or Latimer himself when he presided over For
est's death, felt they had a duty to do all they could to eliminate heresy.
We should remember all this, because the ideological cold war between
Protestants and Catholics formed much of the background to the emer
gence of modern philosophy.4 Louis Dupre has argued recently that we
2. "A Tale of Two Martyrs" Christian History (Vol. XIV, No. 4), 18-19.
3. Martin, Dennis. "Catholic Counterpoint: What was it like to be on the losing side of
England's Reformation?" Christian History (Vol. XIV; No. 4), 30.
4. I owe to George Marsden the likening of the Protestant/Catholic conflict of the six
teenth and seventeenth centuries to the anti-Marxist/Marxist conflict of the twentieth. Both
cold wars were protracted struggles, they were interrupted by "hot" wars, and they mixed
nationalism with ideology. Cf. Marsden, George. Religion and American Culture (Fort Worth,
TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1990), 12-13.
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should be wary of oversimplifying our accounts of the emergence of the
modern worldview, and he is probably right; significant changes in Euro
pean intellectual history going back to the thirteenth century are part of the
story of the development of modernity.5 Nevertheless, there is also merit in
the traditional identification of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as
the beginning of the modern era. Dupre describes the Enlightenment as a
canonizing of options which had first been opened by the first phase of the
passage to modernity. 6 One of those options, which the Enlightenment can
onized as a settled principle, was a turn from authority to rationality as
ground for knowledge.
During the Catholic/Protestant cold war, both sides appealed to
authority-of scripture or of church-to certify truth. Early modem philos
ophers from Descartes and Leibniz to Hume and Kant appealed rather to
reason. Many saw this not only as intellectually better, since appeal to
authority was akin to superstition while appeal to reason was akin to science,
but also practically better, since religious appeals to authority played so eas
ily into the hand of warmakers. It was the Europe of

1648

and after, tired

out by a hundred years of religious wars, that accepted a new worldview. To
be sure, the cold war continued, but it played a gradually decreasing role in
international politics, and to an ever-increasing degree Europe's intellectu
als looked to reason rather than authority.7
It is hard to generalize about such things, but we probably owe the
emergence of the virtue of civility to Enlightenment modernism. With phi
losophers like Hume, and especially Kant, the modern worldview changed
the way Europeans thought about political enemies. If reasonable people
can differ, and if a person's dignity is founded on his or her reason, then
even people who disagree with each other ought to be able to respect and
tolerate each other. It is not a remarkable coincidence that while Kant was
explaining that the categorical imperative, which was the product of reason
alone, required that we treat all people as ends and not merely means, T ho
mas Jefferson and other American reformers were enshrining religious
freedom and toleration as fundamental principles of government. It was a
fundamental assumption of the Enlightenment, which Kant only made

5. See Dupre, Louis. Passage to Modernity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993),
To oversimplifY, Dupre's thesis is that the Enlightenment, which is usually thought of as the
beginning of the modern era, was the second of two important revolutions in thought that
transformed the Medieval world into the modern world. His book charts the first, largely thir
teenth century, revolution.
6. Dupre, 253.
7. It's easy to overstate and oversimplifY. Medieval philosophers and theologians did not
denigrate reason. But, like Aquinas, they sought to bring their theorizing under the authority
of church, creed, and scripture. I take it that one mark of a modern philosopher is that he or
she will not submit the products of philosophical investigation to external authority.
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more explicit than most of his contemporaries, that Reason was the same for
all people. Universal rationality was the modernist basis for civility.

Postmodern Prospectsfor Civility
We live, as the culture watchers constantly din into our ears, in a post
modern world. If Dupre is right, in one sense this is simply not true. Our
culture is still working out the implications of the breakup of the ancient
and medieval worldviews; in that sense we are still moderns. What the cul
ture watchers have right is that we no longer accept some of the principles
of the Enlightenment.
To illustrate: The modernist (whether of the fourteenth century, the
eighteenth century or the twentieth century) believes that the

now is a sig

nificantly new thing.8 All modernists believe that the contingencies of time
produce

fundamental reshapings of knowledge and reality. (Ancient and

medieval worldviews denied that true knowledge or reality could undergo
fundamental

change.)

Some

modernists,

Enlightenment

modernists,

believed that changes over time exhibited progress. Some contemporary
modernists, who call themselves post-modernists because they define mod
ernism by the Enlightenment, have come to disbelieve in progress. They
worry: If the human race is not progressing morally, is it really good that we
are gaining more technological power? So, while all modernists (in Dupre's
sense) believe that time has produced basic change, some of them have
given up thinking that change is progress.
Something significant happens when our contemporaries reject princi
ples

of

the Enlightenment, even

if

"post-modernism"

may

be

an

inappropriate description of that rejection. Now, one of the most widely
proclaimed post-modernist (or anti-Enlightenment) assumptions is the
rejection of universal rationality. The standards of reason, especially the
standards of practical reason, which Enlightenment philosophers like Kant
assumed to be universal, are labeled partial and parochial by post-modern
ists. Some people, who accept certain assumptions about individualism,
objectivism, and self-interested rationality-that is, people with Enlighten
ment worldviews-will approach problems of practical reason in ways that
Kant or Hume or Hobbes would recognize as rational. But other people do
not think that way. So "rationality" means different things to different peo
ples, say the post-modernists.
This post-modem rejection of universal reason is surely right. Alasdair
Macintyre, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, persuades me that even in
the West we have several different traditions of practical reason, competing
for our allegiance.9 Autonomous reason, a capitalized "Reason" that stands

8. Cf. Dupre, 145.
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alone independent of historically conditioned reasoners, does not exist
unless in the mind of God.
So the Enlightenment assumption of universal rationality is under
mined. Post-modernists find they no longer believe in it. "What happens to
civility in these conditions?
For an Enlightenment modernist, a political opponent can be assumed
to be a reasonable person. The political opponent can be appealed to on
grounds of good evidence or clear reasoning. The political opponent, a rea
sonable person, is worthy of respect, even if disagreements persist between
competing parties. The implications of Kant's categorical imperative are
quite clear: We can work to defeat our political opponents-in a sense, they
are obstacles to be overcome, means to our ends-but we may never treat
political opponents as merely obstacles. We must always treat them as ends
in themselves. Even further, since our worst political opponents are rational
seekers of truth, they are actually our allies. Through vigorous debate, seek
ers pursue the truth together.
But post-modernists need not believe this. The post-modernist does
not assume that all people are "reasonable." Rather, some people are rea
sonable in one way, while others are reasonable in another way, and still
others are reasonable in still other ways-and the various kinds of rational
ity may be incommensurable and irreconcilable. There is no way to appeal
to all political eneinies on the grounds of evidence (they may not see the
evidence as relevant) or good reasons (they may reject the assumptions
behind the reasons). Therefore there is no compelling need to treat political
eneinies with respect. After all, some political eneinies are most easily dealt
with summarily: we see them just as obstacles. There is no independent
standard of rationality which would require us to treat them as more than
obstacles.
Some post-modernists, like Richard Rorty, still urge civility and other
liberal values. But he does not urge this on the basis of some truth about the
universe or ourselves. Rather, this is just the way liberal people happen to
feel.1 0
I suspect-this is where I pull out my crystal ball and predict-that we
shall soon hear from post-modern voices that do not urge civility. Like
Nietzsche, they will call us to a bracing acceptance of our "thisness": "I

am

this, and I want that. My political enemy is that which stands between me
and the fulfillment of my desire." From a subjectivist point of view, the
enemy is and can be nothing more than an obstacle. And there is no objec
tive

point

of

view

(objectivity

is

another

Enlightenment

concept

deconstructed by post-modernists) to correct the subjectivist's point of view.
9. Macintyre, Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988), Cf. pp. 1-11 for an initial statement of his position, which is argued
at length throughout the book.
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In short, I predict dark days ahead for civility. As we know it, civility is

largely the gift of Enlightenment assumptions that we no longer make.
Those who feel like it, or whose historically contingent way of exercising
practical reason recommends it, will continue to treat their political oppo
nents well and train themselves in the virtues that motivate such behavior.
But as people come to recognize their feelings in this regard and the ways
they have learned to think about this matter as pure historical accidents,
they will have little defense against the temptations of incivility.

Solid Groundfor Civility
All of this suggests an historical irony, given the history of civility out
lined above. Though Christians of the modern era have learned to regard
civility as a virtue through the influence of Enlightenment modernism, it is
Christian doctrine, not modernist philosophy, which provides a sufficient
foundation for civility.
This may seem surprising. After all, according to my brief account of
reformation disputes, it was the Christian assumption that true doctrine had
great importance that lay behind a logic of intolerance. "Since we have the
truth, the heretic must be made to see that it is the truth." Right?
Wrong. The assumption that truth exists is not the problem. We need
further assumptions to create the logic of intolerance. First, we need to
think that we have the right formulation of the truth. Second, we assume
that we gain our right formulation of the truth independently of the
thought of those who disagree with us. Third, we believe that the truth is
itself compatible with intolerance. A "fallibilist" rejects the first two of these
assumptions; that is, a fallibilist will always keep alive in her mind the possi
bility that she is wrong, and she will believe that opposing views are useful
in the pursuit of truth. Some philosophers have suggested that fallibilism is,
or is part of, the cure for intolerance.1 1 It may be that we should be falli
bilists about our political positions and many other beliefs we hold.
However, rather than dipping into that debate, I want to take issue with the
third assumption just mentioned.

10. Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), Cf. p. 189: " . . . a belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying
for, among people who are quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contin
gent historical circumstance." And pp. 197-98: "There is no neutral, noncircular way to defend
the liberal's claim that cruelty is the worst thing we do, any more than there is a neutral way to
back up Nietzsche's assertion that this claim expressed a resentful, slavish attitude. . . . We can
not look back behind the processes of socialization which convinced us twentieth-century lib
erals of the validity of this claim and appeal to something which is more "real" or less
ephemeral that the historical contingencies which brought those processes into existence. We
have to start from where we are... . "
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Most parties to reformation disputes, and many political groups in the
generations since, have assumed that truth is compatible with the forcible
suppression of error. They have thought that truth is so important that
error must be suppressed. But what if the content of truth was itself incom
patible with incivility? If that were the case, it would be possible for a
person to hold a truth with absolute certainty, and believe that opposing
views are useless in the pursuit of truth, and still have good reasons for

being civil. 1 2

My belief is that truth is incompatible with intolerance or incivility.
The proper grounds for civility are not to be found in fallibilism, but in the
truth itself. It is not because I am uncertain of the doctrines I espouse that I
listen attentively to those who disagree with me, but because of the content
of those doctrines.
W hat truth or doctrines could I be referring to? Just this, the heart of
Christianity: Jesus Christ died for sinners, that is, for his enemies.
Christian dogma teaches us that we, who made ourselves God's ene
mies, are the objects of his love. His love overcame that emnity and made us
his friends, through the cross. Jesus' words, expressed on the cross about the
particular soldiers who crucified him, express his attitude toward all his ene
mies: "Father, forgive them, for they don't know what they' re doing" (Luke

23:34).
Christian truth requires civility in at least three ways.

1.

Because God,

in Christ, loved his enemies, Christians have no option but to try to love
their enemies. Christ is our example. 2. Further, Jesus explicitly told his fol
lowers to love their enemies. Christ is our lawgiver.

3.

Further still, as the

light of the world, Jesus is the light in every person. We should look for the
light of Christ in everyone, including our enemies. Christ is our
civility.1 3

logos of

11. Cf. Quinn, Philip L. "Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,"
the Presidential Address delivered at the 93rd Annual Central Division Meeting of the Ameri
can Philosophical Association, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa
tion, Vol. 69, No. 2, 47. Quinn agrees with other writers who think that fallibilism ought not to
be a requirement of discourse in the public square, since such a requirement would exclude
certain religious traditions, which explicitly reject fallibilism, from joining in political debate.
In this regard it is helpful to remember the form of fallibilism of the dissenting puritans in
the Westminster Assembly, who helped move English society from the religious wars of the
sixteenth century to the Act ofToleration in 1689. Although the Dissenters did not carry the day
during the Westminster Assembly, they argued that differences of opinion among Christians
were due to the weakness of human apprehension of the truth, and that differences of opinion
could lead to fuller apprehension of the truth. Thus, the Dissenters' position anticipated that of
fallibilists. Cf. Koivisto, Rex. One Lord, One Faith: A Theology for Cross-Denominational Renewal
(Wheaton, IL: Victor Books/SP Publications, Inc. 1993), 98-101.
12. These comments should not be construed as meaning that I reject fallibilism. The
point is that one need not be a fallibilist to have good grounds for civility. We don't have to
convert people to fallibilism to convert them to civility.
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Part of the irony, of course, is that though Christians have always had
perfectly good reasons to treat their enemies well, they failed to do so and
had to learn civility from Enlightenment philosophers. T his was not just
because Christians failed to live up to their understanding of the gospel, but
because they partly failed to understand the gospel. Part of the Quaker mis
sion

in

history,

it

seems

to

me,

has

been

to

help

correct

that

misunderstanding. Quakers, who understand that the light of Christ is
present in others, even enemies, can help other Christians to see that civility
is a virtue.
If my earlier prediction comes true, we will hear Nietzsche-like post
modern voices that forthrightly reject civility. I hope my prediction does not
come true; it would be better to live in a culture that honors civility than to
be an accurate forecaster. But even if some around us find that they no
longer have reasons to be civil, Christians should not be deterred from
training themselves in this virtue. We want to be like Christ; we want to
obey his commands; and we want to recognize Christ in all people, includ
ing our political opponents.
In conclusion, a small correction to my definition of civility should be
made. I defined civility as a character trait (or traits) which moves one to
treat enemies well. As it stands, that definition is act oriented, as if right
actions were of first importance and virtues consisted in propensities to
carry out right actions. I don't think that is the way we should understand
the relationship of actions and virtues, but it is hard to express the inter
twined nature of doing and being without extending this essay far too much.
Perhaps it is enough to say that Christians ought to strive to be civil as much
as they ought to act civilly.14

13. Readers might compare this idea-that Christ is the logos of our civility-to Arthur
Roberts' paper, "Good and Evil in a World Threatened by Nuclear Omnicide: A Proposed
Epistemological Paradigm." The paradigm he proposes posits rational, sensory, and intuitive
modes of apprehending truth, modes which different individuals combine in varying ways.
Such a model reinforces for us the need to listen to others. Other people, even political oppo
nents, can teach us something of the logos, the center toward which we must move if we want to
progress morally, intellectually or esthetically.
14. Thanks to Paul Anderson for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this
paper.

